

# Bridge Owners Forum

Structural-Safety

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January 2018



# Structural-Safety Group

*The Institution  
of Structural  
Engineers*



## SCOSS

Standing Committee on Structural Safety

- Founded 1976
- Collects data from public sources
- Does unacceptable risk exist?
- Publishes Alerts and Topic Papers


## CROSS

Confidential Reporting on Structural Safety

- Started 2005
- Collects confidential data
- Provides comments on lessons to be learned
- Maintains report database
- Publishes Newsletters


Voluntary committee and panel members

# Pyramid of Risk




*Diagram courtesy of ASRS*


\* Precursors should be reported internally and can be reported to CROSS





# CROSS Reports - Concern About




# From Temporary Works to Demolition




# Fixing Failures



## Numerous reports



Holding down nuts



# Balcony Collapses



No rebar in  
top of slab



# Eindhoven Airport Car Park - 2017



# Poor Practice on Temporary Stages



Lack of stability

Precursors



Lack of anchorage

# Indiana Stage Collapse - August 2011



International SCOSS Alert issued

# DJ killed, others injured in stage collapse at Brazilian dance music festival – December 2017



# City Gates - SCOSS Alert

## Structural Stability/Integrity of Steel Frame Buildings



# City Gates - SCOSS Alert Sudden Collapse



# Edinburgh Schools - 2016



# Inquiry Into the Construction - SCOSS Alert



Wide ranging Inquiry

# **Defects found at 72 more Scottish school buildings**

# New Ferry Properties - March 2017



# New Ferry Properties - Gas Explosion



# Tower Block Tragedies



Ronan Point 1968




Grenfell Tower 2017

# Systemic Issues

Edinburgh	City Gates	Grenfell	CROSS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Client's role</li> <li>• Detailing</li> <li>• Sub-contractors</li> <li>• Brick laying</li> <li>• Lack of supervision</li> <li>• Building regulation approval</li> <li>• No Clerks of Works</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Client's role</li> <li>• Detailing</li> <li>• Sub-contractors</li> <li>• Steelwork fabrication</li> <li>• Lack of supervision</li> <li>• Building regulation approval</li> <li>• Clerk of Works?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Client's role</li> <li>• Product choice</li> <li>• Sub-contractors</li> <li>• Cladding and insulation</li> <li>• Supervision?</li> <li>• Building regulation approval</li> <li>• Clerk of Works?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Yes</li> <li>• Yes</li> <li>• Yes</li> <li>• Yes</li> <li>• Yes</li> <li>• Yes</li> <li>• Yes</li> </ul>

**Lack of awareness of potential consequences**

# Cladding Fires



Lacrosse Tower  
Melbourne 2014




Dubai hotel 2015

## Precursors

# Current DCLG Sampling/Testing

>181 ACP Cladding Samples Tested (to date)



© Dr Luke Bisby, The University of Edinburgh, [luke.bisby@ed.ac.uk](mailto:luke.bisby@ed.ac.uk)

# DCLG/BRE Fire Tests



# Test No. 1 Stopped After 395 Seconds - Failed

100 mm rigid  
polyisocyanurate (PIR)  
foam insulation boards


4mm aluminium  
composite material  
(ACM) panels with  
polyethylene (PE) filler



# Test No. 4 Stopped After 1 Hour - Passed

180mm stone wool  
insulation board

4mm ACM panels  
with fire retardant filler



An aerial photograph of a large bridge spanning a wide river. The bridge has multiple lanes and is surrounded by construction equipment and materials, suggesting it is under repair or construction. The river is visible in the background, and the surrounding area includes some greenery and infrastructure.

# Lessons from Previous Failures

- Catastrophic failures are a constant threat
- Primary cause is usually failure in leadership
- Competency is assumed but is not always present
- Cost cutting is often an ingredient
- Poor designs, poor construction, poor management, poor communication and poor maintenance all contribute
- Learning from precursors can prevent future failure events

# Judith Hackitt review: building a safer future

- Current regulations and guidance are too complex and unclear.
- Regulations and guidance must be simplified and unambiguous.
- Clarity of roles and responsibilities is poor.
- The means of assessing and ensuring the competency of key people throughout the system is inadequate.
- Compliance, enforcement and sanctions processes are too weak.
- The rules for ensuring high-rise and other complex buildings are built safe and remain safe should be more risk-based and proportionate.
- Primary responsibility for ensuring that buildings are fit for purpose must rest with those who commission, design and build the project.

# Bridge collapses 2017

# A14 Highway Italy – March 2017



# Big Sur California March 2017



## 2 Dead, Several Missing As Bridge Collapses In Goa, Navy Called In For Rescue Ops – 19 May 2017



# How did a \$12 million bridge collapse in Kenya? – July 2017



# Singapore Highway Viaduct – July 2017



# Pedestrian bridge collapses on Highway 4, one dead – Israel 14 August 2017



# Bolton railway station bridge collapse: Reopening date announced – August 2017



# 5 hurt in N3 pedestrian bridge collapse South Africa - August 2017



# Mumbai station stampede kills at least 22 amid rumour bridge was collapsing – September 2017



# 10 Years After Bridge Collapse, America Is Still Crumbling – August 2017



In August 2007 the Interstate 35W bridge over the Mississippi River collapsed.

Thirteen people were killed, 145 more were injured, many of them seriously.

# 1 Dead, At Least 57 Injured After Bridge Collapses In Kerala's Chavara – 30 October 2017




The lone bridge linking Uttarkashi to the China border collapsed today, disconnecting dozens of villages –  
December 14 2017



# Prague bridge collapse leaves 4 injured – 2 December 2017



# Part of I-85 collapses in Atlanta after massive fire - 30 March 2017



# M1 bridge fire - 2011





# Liverpool Arena Car Park December 2017




liquid fuel fire


1,400 cars destroyed



# Destroyed



# Elios collision tolerant drone





# Proposed data bases

- IABSE task group on Forensic Engineering – Bridge Failures
- ICE/Structural-Safety central repository of buildings' data
- ICE In Plain Sight scheme for a log of infrastructure information (using CROSS)
- HSE/Lloyds Register/Manchester University repository of safety-related events
- NIST/CROSS/ASCE/SEI International failure data base



# Reflective Thinking




- Consider risks of both known and unforeseen events
- Consider the risks of unexpected consequences
- Review risk when circumstances change e.g. new materials, new forms of construction, emerging technologies
- Review ageing infrastructure: look at new methods of evaluation and repair
- Release safety-critical information that could help others
- Report bridge and infrastructure concerns to CROSS



# CROSS International








# John Smeaton, Civil Engineer (1724-92)



*'Stone, wood and iron are wrought and put together by mechanical methods, but the greatest work is to keep right the animal part of the machinery.'*

BradyHeywood



[www.structural.safety.org](http://www.structural.safety.org)

